Artillery in Ukraine – What Lessons for Australia?
Australia’s existing artillery is mainly composed of the 48 M777A2 155mm 39 caliber lightweight towed howitzers acquired in the early 2010s as part of the LAND 17 Phase 1A program[1]. Australia was also intended to receive two batteries of self-propelled guns (SPG) as part of this program, but budget restraints saw the purchase of additional M777 instead[2]. The current LAND 8116 program seeks to redress that loss, and the Government has moved forward with the decision to procure at least 30 K9 SPGs and support vehicles[3]. In addition, in 2022 the Australia government began the process of purchasing 20 M142 HIMARS long-range rocket artillery systems.[4] Light guns, cruise and ballistic missiles, UCAVs, mortars, SAM systems, and indirect fire infantry weapons are excluded from the scope of this article.
Artillery has played a major and decisive role in the fighting in Ukraine, with the rolling weight of massive Russian barrages wearing down Ukraine defenses, whilst precision Ukrainian strikes at Russian logistical and command nodes attempt to degrade Russian offensive capabilities. The Russian army showcased the power of its artillery systems in Ukraine as early as 2014, when cross-border rocket strikes on Ukrainian forces in Zelenopillia rendered multiple battalions from the 24th, 72nd and 79th brigades combat ineffective and forced their withdrawal[5]. In 2022, Russian tactical successes in Luhansk Oblast around Severodonetsk were enabled by an enormous artillery overmatch that allowed them to unload ten times the amount of ordinance as Ukrainian forces – approximately 60,000 Russian shells a day[6]. On the flipside, Ukraine has been able to use precise artillery strikes to destroy and disable large numbers of Russian AFVs and the arrival of HIMARS systems has allowed Ukraine to target Russian supply dumps, transport infrastructure, command nodes, and critical EW and AD systems[7]. Ukrainian 155mm artillery fire in combination with combat drones helped to dislodge Russian forces from the strategically critical Snake Island[8], allowing the re-opening of Ukraine’s vital black sea port of Odessa. The ability to bring more shells and rockets on target has enabled tactical successes on both sides.
Artillery Systems
Below is a list of
the main Ukrainian and Russian heavy artillery and rocket systems on the Ukrainian
battlefield. Many Soviet-vintage pieces are widely operated by both the
Ukrainian Army and Russian Forces. The high intensity
of fighting, heavy media coverage, and steady flow of high-quality footage from
Ukrainian and Russian forces provides real-world insight into the performance
of these systems in combat conditions. Other systems seeing use in Ukraine, but
not included in this list, include the UR-77, BM-21, 2S22, 2S1, 2S5, 2A36, D-30,
and FH-70.
Towed guns
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| Name: D20
Caliber: 152mm L/34 Range: 17.4km w/ OF-540 | 24km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 5,700kg User: Russia and Ukraine A 152mm towed howitzer. Standard cold war howitzer of the Soviet Union, replacing the WW2 era D1. Huge numbers exported by the Soviet Union make this one of the most common towed howitzers globally. Large numbers in active use and storage by both Ukraine and Russia.
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Name: 2A65 Caliber: 152mm L/47 Range: 24.7km w/ OF-45 | 29-36km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 6,800kg User: Russia and Ukraine A 152mm towed howitzer. Soviet replacement for the D20 with significantly increased range. In active use by both Ukraine and Russia. |
Rocket systems
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Name: M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) Caliber: 227mm x12 Range: 92km w/ M31 Weight: 25,000kg User: Ukraine A tracked rocket artillery system. Introduced by the US Army during the Cold War, the system has seen widespread export success. Two pre-loaded pods allow for quicker reloading, and can mount two ATACMS short range ballistic missiles (SRBM) in their place. 9 systems have been gifted to Ukraine by foreign donors. |
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Name: M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) Caliber: 227mm x6 Range: 92km w/ M31 Weight: 16,250kg User: Ukraine A wheeled rocket artillery system. Holds only one pre-loaded MLRS pod with an improved fire control system, and can mount a single ATACMS. System is being actively exported to U.S partners, such as Australia. The United States has provided 16 systems to Ukraine. |
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Name: TOS-1A Caliber: 220mm x30 Range: 6km w/ M0.1.01.04M Weight: 45,300kg User: Russia A tracked thermobaric rocket artillery system. Built on the chassis of the T-72 tank and firing short-range but powerful thermobaric rockets, this system is designed for breaking down urban or heavily-fortified positions. Has seen extensive use by Russia in Ukraine.
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Name: BM-27 Uragan Caliber: 220mm x16 Range: 35km w/ 9M27F Weight: 20,000kg User: Russia and Ukraine A wheeled rocket artillery system. Built on a heavy duty wheeled chassis, the Uragan is often used to deploy cluster munitions. In common use by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.
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Name: BM-30 Smerch Caliber: 300mm x12 Range: 90km w/ 9M528 Weight: 43,700kg User: Russia and Ukraine A wheeled rocket artillery system. The most long-range and powerful rocket artillery available to Russia and Ukraine (before the arrival of the HIMARS). A wide variety of munitions are available, including both Russian and Ukrainian produced precision guided rockets. In common use by both Russian and Ukrainian forces. |
Self-propelled systems
.jpg/1280px-2S3_Akatsiya_Ukrainian_Army%2C_2016_(cropped).jpg) |
Name: 2S3 Caliber: 152mm L/34 Range: 17.4km w/ OF540 | 24km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 28,000kg User: Russia and Ukraine A tracked 152mm self-propelled gun. Standard Soviet Cold-War self-propelled howitzer, ballistically similar to D-20 towed howitzer. Large numbers in active use and storage by both Ukraine and Russia.
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Name: M109 Caliber: 155mm L/39 Range: 18.km w/ M107 | 24km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 27,500kg User: Ukraine A tracked 155mm self-propelled gun. Standard American Cold War self-propelled howitzer, exported to many NATO and non-NATO states, this is one of the most common SPGs globally. Many variations and upgrades exist. Foreign donors have gifted Ukraine 22 M109A3GN and 22 M109A4. |
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Name: 2S19 Msta-S Caliber: 152mm L/47 Range: 24.7km w/ OF-45 | 29-36km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 42,000kg User: Russia and Ukraine A tracked 152mm self-propelled gun. Soviet replacement for the 2S3 SPG based on the chassis of the T-72. Ballistically similar to 2A65. Although this system existed in Ukraine’s inventory before the Russian invasion, with numbers further bolstered by captured units, it has primarily seen use by Russian forces for whom it is the standard SPG. |
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Name: 2S7 Pion Caliber: 203mm L/53 Range: 37.4km w/ 3VOF34 Weight: 46,500kg User: Russia and Ukraine A tracked 203mm self-propelled gun. Based on a special purpose tracked chassis mounting an open-top gun. The most powerful gun in use in Ukraine, it’s long range and destructive power make it well suited for counter-battery fire and demolishing fortified positions. Large numbers are in active use and storage by both Russia and Ukraine. |
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Name: PzH-2000 Caliber: 155mm L/52 Range: 18km w/ M107 | 30-50km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 55,800kg User: Ukraine A tracked 155mm self-propelled gun. Based on a chassis derived from the Leopard 2 tank, this systems long-range, high rate-of-fire, and excellent mobility made it a class-leader for many decades. Foreign donors have provided 15 of these systems to Ukraine. |
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Name: AHS-Krab Caliber: 155mm L/52 Range: 18km w/ M107 | 30-50km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 48,000 User: Ukraine A tracked 155mm self-propelled gun. Developed in Poland, this system combines the turret, and gun of the British AS-90M with the chassis of the South Korean K9. 18 units have been acquired by Ukraine from Poland.
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Name: CAESER 6x6 Caliber: 155mm L/52 Range: 18km w/ M107 | 30-50km with extended-range ammunition Weight: 17,000kg User: Ukraine A wheeled 155mm self-propelled gun. Based on an armoured 6x6 Renault truck chassis (although other wheeled chassis may be used), this system provides excellent on-road and strategic mobility compared to tracked systems. Produced in France, this system has seen adoption across a number of NATO militaries. France has provided 18 CAESERs to Ukraine. |
Towed vs Self-propelled Guns
The experiences of the first World War cemented the role of towed heavy guns and howitzers in supporting infantry operations[9]. Self-propelled artillery was largely introduced to complement towed guns during the Second World War, as armies sought artillery systems that could match the mobility and survivability of their armoured formations[10]. Towed and self-propelled artillery continue to operate in these roles together on the modern battlefield. Early self-propelled systems were crude in comparison to modern SPGs, no more than an open topped gun platform attached to a tank chassis. Below I will explore some of the advantages and disadvantages of towed and self-propelled artillery systems.
Mobility
Towed heavy guns require a prime mover (usually a truck or tractor) for maneuver, whilst positioning the gun is done by hand or attached Auxiliary Power Unit (APU), whilst modern SPGs are built around either a tracked, armoured, turreted chassis or heavy-duty military truck. Towed guns generally fall somewhere between 4-9 tons, whilst self-propelled systems may weigh between 15-55 tons depending on their armour level, on-board ammunition storage and whether they are tracked or wheeled. Towed guns may require additional prime movers for their ammunition and crew, whilst self-propelled systems typically carry crew and ammunition on-board.
These mobility differences can be either an advantage or disadvantage, depending on the context. The lighter weight of towed guns can allow them to be maneuvered by hand, crane, or helicopter to difficult but advantageous firing positions, such as mountains, caves, or urban buildings and bunkers. Whilst not from Ukraine, the advantages (and disadvantages) of this mobility can be seen in footage[11] from Syria, where government troops are using a crane to position a towed gun to the upper floors of a building – and are subsequently engaged by an opposition ATGM team. The slow speed of positioning a towed gun can allow hostile forces to detect and engage the gun before it can begin firing. The mobility of a towed gun is inherently tied to that of its prime mover – wheel-based systems provided excellent strategic mobility but struggle to follow tracked vehicles into difficult terrain.
The mobility of self-propelled systems, however, is dependent on the base platform. Systems based on tracked tank chassis, like the PzH-2000 and 2S19, retain the excellent cross-country mobility of their host platform. Footage[12] of Ukrainian forces operating a M109A3GN across muddy trails and agricultural fields showcases this. The heavy weight and high fuel consumption of these platforms, however, requires rail or tank transporters to achieve strategic mobility and may prohibit them from travelling on civilian infrastructure, such as road traffic bridges or car ferries. Wheeled systems such as the CAESER 6x6 represent a compromise – they retain the strategic mobility of a towed gun whilst allowing more rapid positioning of the gun, without the cross-country capabilities of a tracked chassis.
Survivability
With the proliferation of UAVs, counter-battery radars, and SIGINT systems across the modern battlefield, the accuracy and speed of counter-battery fire has dramatically increased. The ability to avoid or survive counter-battery fire is essential. It is here that self-propelled systems have a major advantage over their towed counter-parts. The improved cross-country mobility of tracked systems provides them a greater range of terrains operate and hide in. Similarly, the speed of a self-propelled systems to ‘shoot and scoot’ is significantly greater than that of a towed gun. Comparing footage of Russian crews performing ‘shoot and scoots’ with towed D-30 guns[13] against footage of CAESER 6x6 and K9 self-propelled systems[14] highlights the higher speed and reduced crew workload required to position and fire SPGs, increasing the survivability of self-propelled systems.
Likewise, the improved armour and mobility of heavy tracked chassis significantly increases the survivability of gun and crew compared to towed guns. Shrapnel can disable towed guns by destroying tyres, FCS, recoil systems, and killing or injuring crew – such damage can be seen in this footage of a Ukrainian M777[15]. Ukrainian experience has shown that as many as 1 in 3 M777 towed guns will be disabled by shrapnel from counter battery fire in a typical artillery engagement[16]. Whilst comparable figures are not available for Ukraine’s self-propelled systems, footage of a Ukrainian M109A3GN surviving a strike from a loitering munition[17] shows the improved survivability of these systems. Whilst not operational on the Ukrainian battlefield, self-propelled systems may also be fitted with Active Protection Systems (APS).
Reliability
‘Self-propelled systems’ are more than just guns on wheels or tracks. They include the gun, fire control system (FCS), ammunition storage, crew compartment, and automotive chassis. This increased complexity enables the fantastic mobility and survivability of these systems; however, these features introduce additional points of failure as well as increased procurement, logistics and maintenance costs. This increased complexity has consequences for battlefield performance as well. Of the 15 PzH-2000 SPGs delivered by foreign donors to Ukraine in June, only 5 remained combat-capable by August due to a failure of the loading mechanism, a result of firing well-over the recommended 100-rounds per day[18]. Simple automotive failures can lead to complete system losses, for example; a Russian 2S19 with a damaged chassis and throw track was abandoned by its crew and subsequently captured by Ukrainian forces[19]. In contrast, towed guns often feature either primary or back-up manual loading, gun laying, and FCS, and damaged prime movers may be easily replaced or substituted.
Tube vs Rocket Artillery
Modern rocket artillery, was mainly developed during the Second World War, allowing artillery formations to saturate large areas with fire in seconds[20]. Rocket artillery has by and large been self-propelled since inceptions, with the majority of systems based on wheeled chassis. The Soviet Union was a major proponent of rocket artillery with the ubiquitous BM-13 ‘Katyusha’, and many of its successor Cold War systems are seeing use on the Ukrainian battlefield. Rocket artillery has a number of advantages and disadvantages vis-à-vis traditional tube artillery.
Firepower
The most significant difference is the availability of firepower that rocket artillery systems provide. The low recoil and barrel wear of rocket propulsion allows rocket artillery systems to mount and fire multiple barrels simultaneously. One battery of eight BM-30s can drop 9 ton of unitary HE, or 62,000 dual-purpose submunitions, on a target in seconds. Footage of the city of Pisky being pounded by multiple thermobaric munitions from a TOS-1A[21] shows the weight of fire rocket artillery can bring. Multiple barrels can also enable multiple payloads, and one fire mission may utilize a mix of HE, cluster, thermobaric, thermite, white phosphorous, or special purpose munitions. The M270 and HIMARS systems can also mount SRBMs in place of their rocket payload. The trade-off is the significantly increased time and complexity for full-systems reloads compared to the sustained rate of fire available to tube artillery.
Accuracy
While rocket artillery systems can unleash enormous firepower, they often do so with far reduced accuracy. Continuous propulsion after launch makes the circular error probable (CEP) of rockets significantly larger than kinetic-energy driven shells. Multiple barrels on the same chassis, in addition to multiple points of impact, increase the difficulty of calibration and fire correction in comparison to traditional guns or howitzers. The adoption of guided munitions for rocket systems such as the HIMARS’s M31 or the Smerch’s 9М542 have reduced this weakness entirely, allowing for precise strikes. Footage of the Antonovsky Bridge, a vital Russian supply chokepoint across the Dnieper river, with multiple points of impact within a 20-meter cluster[22] highlights the dramatic improvements in accuracy that PGMs can provided rocket artillery.
Range
Due to the inherent nature of their propulsion, rocket artillery systems often have far greater range than comparable tube artillery. Systems such as the HIMARS and Smerch can easily reach 80+km, with prototype extended-range munitions that can push out to 120+km blending the division between rocket artillery and ballistic missiles. As seen in Ukraine, this can enable strikes on important rear-area points such as supply depots, radar and command posts. However, as most rocket systems used a fixed propellant, their minimum range is much greater than artillery with bagged propellants.
What lessons for Australia?
The major lesson for the ADF is that artillery remains the true ‘King of the Battlefield’, and the force that can bring more shells and rockets on target can significantly degrade enemy capabilities, enabling decisive breakthrough by ground forces. Towed guns, SPGs, and rocket artillery are all essential pieces of the firepower puzzle. Using the right combination of artillery systems can reduce their individual decencies, creating a fire support system that is more than the sum of its parts.
Recent procurement decisions by the ADF have shown that it is ahead of the curve on this front. The recent purchase of the class-leading K9 SPG, following on from the excellent performance of its Polish derivative the AHS-Krab in Ukraine, has filled a gap in Australia’s armoured formations that has existed since the retirement of the Yeramba SPG in 1957. Concerns about the high weight of these systems, and their ability to operate in the Indo-Pacific region, are misplaced – they will be operating in support of the Army’s 66.8-ton M1A2 SEPv3 regardless. The arrival of HIMARS will introduce rocket artillery to the Australian Army for the first time, giving it an organic long-range firepower asset that can strike deep into the enemy’s rear. The backbone of the Army’s artillery component, the M777, has shown itself to perform comparably to other towed heavy guns – at a significant weight reduction. Prudent procurement decisions by the Department of Defence and the ADF have put Australia in good stead for any future conflict, where artillery will no doubt play a key role in victory.
[1] "M777 155mm Lightweight Towed Howitzer". 2022. Australian Army. https://www.army.gov.au/our-work/equipment-uniforms/equipment/artillery/m777-155mm-lightweight-towed-howitzer.
[2] Butterly, Nick. 2012. "Defence faces $1B Budget cut". The West Australian, 2012. https://thewest.com.au/news/australia/defence-faces-1b-budget-cut-ng-ya-322861.
[3] "LAND 8116 Protected Mobile Fires". 2022. Defence Connect. https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/major-programs/land-8116-protected-mobile-fires.
[4] Grevatt, Jon. 2022. "Australian Army makes HIMARS procurement bid". Janes. https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/australian-army-makes-himars-procurement-bid.
[5] "Bellingcat Report - Origin of artillery attacks on Ukrainian Military positions in Eastern Ukraine between 14 July 2014 and 8 August 2014". 2015. Bellingcat. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2015/02/17/origin-of-artillery-attacks/.
[6] Schogol, Jeff. 2022. "Russia is Hammering Ukraine with up to 60,000 artillery shells and rockets every day". Task & Purpose. https://taskandpurpose.com/news/russia-artillery-rocket-strikes-east-ukraine/?
[7] "Russia lost modern Air Defense Radar and EW System after MLRS HIMARS strike". 2022. Defense Express. https://en.defence-ua.com/news/russia_lost_modern_air_defense_radar_and_ew_system_after_the_himers_strike-3618.html.
[8] Army Recognition. 2022. "Ukrainian Bohdana 155mm Howitzer targeting Russian Troops on Snake Island with help of Bayraktar Drone". Armyrecognition. https://www.armyrecognition.com/ukraine_-_russia_conflict_war_2022/discover_ukrainian_bohdana_155mm_howitzer_targeting_russian_troops_on_snake_island_with_help_of_bayraktar_drone.html.
[9] Bole, A.C. 1966. "Towed versus Self-Propelled Artillery in the period prior to 1955: An historical investigation of the argument in the United States Army". Master of Military Art and Science, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. p.14
[10] ibid. pp.31-33
[11] "Opposition ATGM Team engage a Syrian Army crane attempting to place a 57mm AA Gun on the upper floors of a building - 2016". 2021. Reddit. https://www.reddit.com/r/CombatFootage/comments/mtl3md/opposition_atgm_team_engage_a_syrian_army_crane/.
[12] Euromaidan Press. 2022. "Norwegian Self-Propelled Gun M109A3GN firing in a battle against Russians". Twitter. https://twitter.com/EuromaidanPress/status/1551331641800511488?t=jCF2auo-atMK6TKHI20YPg&s=07.
[13] mdfzeh. 2022. "Some Shooting and Scooting with artillery, hauling before UA Counter Battery starts working.". Twitter. https://twitter.com/mdfzeh/status/1534991432582414359.
[14] Mogensen, Mogens Rasmus. 2014. "Comparing K9 and CEASAR Shoot and Scoot capacity". Youtube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcnc66tQlxg.
[15] Mihajlovic, Mike. 2022. "M777 Howitzer with visible battle damage from shrapnel". Twitter. https://twitter.com/MihajlovicMike/status/1542638844238897152.
[16] Magnuson, Stew. 2022. "Ukraine to U.S. Defense Industry: We need long-range, precision weapons". National Defense Magazine. https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2022/6/15/ukraine-to-us-defense-industry-we-need-long-range-precision-weapons.
[17] OSINTtechnical. 2022. "Russian Forces target a Ukrainian M109A3GN with a ZALA Lancet Loitering Munition". Twitter. https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1558253367918530566.
[18] Redaktions Netzwerk Deutschland. 2022. "FDP Politician Warns: Only five out of 15 Self-Propelled Howitzers in Ukraine are operational". Redaktions Netzwerk Deutschland. https://www.rnd.de/politik/ukraine-krieg-nur-noch-5-von-15-panzerhaubitzen-aus-deutschland-einsatzbereit-LOTULBNKTNDCZKLV5NAQJHUY2Y.html.
[19] Danspiun. 2022. "2S19 Msta-S 152mm Losses". Twitter. https://twitter.com/Danspiun/status/1506786414763126787?t=H4foAj18Bh7E0nMTs-66PQ&s=07.
[20] Dullum, Ove. 2010. The Rocket Artillery Reference Book. Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. pp.13-16
[21] Rambar, Rebecca. 2022. "Bombardment of the city of Pesky, by Russia, using Thermobaric Weapons". Twitter. https://twitter.com/RebeccaRambar/status/1557740872980209664?t=aTRtXU_dqyLQp8TSe6cIyA&s=07.
[22] Cole, Brendan. 2022. "Video appears to show key bridge destroyed by Ukraine". Newsweek. https://www.newsweek.com/video-bridge-destroyed-ukraine-russia-antonovsky-dnipro-himars-1729388.
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